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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL
PROTECTION AND THE INHERITANCE
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATES UNDER
INTESTATE SUCCESSION LAWS
Trimble v. Gordon'
Sherman Gordon lived with Jessie Trimble and their illegitimate
daughter Deta until 1974 when he died intestate leaving an estate con-
sisting of a 1974 Plymouth worth approximately $2,500. Gordon had
acknowledged openly that Deta was his child, and a paternity order had
been entered finding him to be Deta's father. Notwithstanding this
acknowledgment and order, an Illinois probate court decreed that Deta
Trimble was not her father's heir. This decree was based on an Illinois
intestate succession statute which provided that an illegitimate child
could inherit only from his mother, and, by negoitive implication, not
from his father.2  Under Illinois law, a legitimate child could inherit
from both his mother and his father.3 The Illinois Supreme Court up-
held the statute on the authority of Labine v. Vincent. 4 The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that this statutory classification
based on illegitimacy violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
Under English common law, an illegitimate child was considered
filius nullius, incapable of inheriting from anyone except the heirs of his
own body.5 The trend in the United States has been toward fairer
1. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
2. IL- REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1961). Section 12 has been replaced by ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Supp. 1976-1977) and provides in relevant part:
An illegitimate child is heir of its mother and of any maternal
ancestor, and of any person from whom its mother might have in-
herited, if living; and the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall
represent such person and take, by descent, any estate which the
parent would have taken, if living. An illegitimate child whose par-
ents inter-marry and who is acknowledged by the father as the
father's child shall be considered legitimate.
3. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3. § 2-2 (Supp. 1976-1977).
4. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). In Labine the Court upheld a Louisiana probate
provision excluding unacknowledged illegitimate children from sharing in their
father's estate. The Court found it within the power of the state to determine the
disposition of property, and that there had been no insurmountable barrier to
the child's inheriting as her father could have included her in a will or legiti-
mated her.
5. See generally Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. REv.
477 (1967); Comment, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection -Denial of Illegitimate
Child's Right of Inheritance From Father Who Had Acknowledged But Not Legitimated
Heir Does Not Constitute a Violation of Child's Equal Protection Rights Under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 392 (1972).
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treatment of illegitimate children; 6 in most states there are statutes pro-
viding for inheritance from the mother.' In spite of this trend, there
still remain many legal barriers to inheritance by illegitimates. Most con-
stitutional challenges to statutory discrimination against illegitimates have
been mounted under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8
The Court traditionally has used two approaches in evaluating dis-
criminatory legislation under the equal protection clause. If a suspect
class or a fundamental right is involved, the Court has applied a strict
scrutiny test, requiring a compelling state interest to uphold the statutory
classification. 9 If the regulation concerns economic matters, the Court
has applied a rational basis test and upheld legislation if lawmakers
could have conceivably concluded that the adopted method was
rationally related to the harm to be prevented. 10 In evaluating illegiti-
macy legislation, the Court has applied an intermediate standard of re-
view." This standard has two aspects: the purpose of the legislation
6. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 14-206 (1956) (current version at ARIZ. REv.
STAT. § 14-2611 (1975)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01.05 (1969); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 109.060 (1957). Arizona, North Dakota, and Oregon have eliminated the con-
cept of illegitimacy and UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109 gives illegitimate children
the same rights as legitimate children.
7. See generally materials cited note 5 supra.
8. The Court has considered illegitimacy legislation twelve times since 1968.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v.
Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532
(1971); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.
1973), summarily aff'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp.
1226 (D. Md.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F.
Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
9. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Although illegitimacy is
analogous to the characteristics of suspect classifications, the Court consistently
has rejected the argument that illegitimacy is a suspect class. See Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976).
10. The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as
violative of the Equal Protection Clause only if based on reasons
totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are pre-
sumed to have acted constitutionally ... and their statutory classifi-
cations will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to jus-
tify them.
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
11. See cases cited note 8 supra. See also Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19-22 (1972). Gunther characterized
this middle level scrutiny as an invigorated rational basis test in which the Court
assesses the means in terms of legislative purposes that have substantial basis in
actuality rather than in conjecture. The old test, according to Gunther, reflected
1978]
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must be a legitimate state interest, and the legislation itself must be ra-
tionally related to furthering that interest.12 If the statutory classifica-
tion does not substantially further a legitimate state interest, the statute is
held to violate equal protection. 13
Applying this standard of review, the Court has invalidated statutory
provisions which, to promote the state's interest in discouraging illicit
relationships, bar an illegitimate child from recovering for the wrongful
death of his mother.' 4 The Court has found no rational relationship
between legitimacy and the right of a child to be compensated for ma-
ternal loss, since barring illegitimate children from exercising wrongful
death claims would not discourage illicit relationships. The Court also
has invalidated provisions in social security and workmen's compensation
acts which, in order to discourage spurious claims and promote legiti-
mate family relationships, conclusively bar certain classes of illegitimates
from receiving benefits.1 5 The Court has pointed out that the danger
of spurious claims of dependency exists for all classes of beneficiaries,
and that it is illogical to assume that people will conform their behavior
to societal norms merely to assure their offspring statutory benefits,10
Furthermore, the purpose of such acts, which is to replace support lost
to the deceased or disabled wage earner's dependents, is not furthered
by excluding dependent children because they are illegitimate.
virtual judicial abdication because it was characterized by extreme judicial defer-
ence to any conceivable legislative purpose, and very few discriminatory classifi-
cations were held unconstitutional under this standard of review.
12. See Gunther, supra note 11.
13. See generally cases cited in notes 14-18 infra.
14. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (statute
barred the mother from recovering for the wrongful death of her illegitimate
child); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
15. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973),
summarily aff'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226
(D. Md.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). See also Maracle v.
Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 234 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Morris v. Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 494 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Watts v. Veneman, 334 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1971),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 476 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gentry v. United
States, 546 F.2d 343 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
16. The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of mar-
riage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is
illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegiti-
mate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and
penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as un-just-way of deterrng the parent.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
[Vol. 43
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The Court also has struck down statutes which arbitrarily exclude all
illegitimate children from securing paternal support. 17 Although the
state has an interest in avoiding the problems of proving paternity, that
interest cannot justify exclusion of all illegitimates. Similarly, the Court
has invalidated provisions in welfare programs which discriminate
against families with illegitimate children.' 8 The state interest in pre-
serving and strengthening legitimate family life is not attained by
excluding illegitimate children. In addition, penalizing families with il-
legitimate children bears no rational relationship to the statutory pur-
pose of providing supplementary income to the working poor.
In deciding Trimble v. Gordon, the Supreme Court applied this mid-
dle level equal protection analysis. The Court rejected the argument that
the discrimination advanced a state interest in promoting legitimate
family relationships, noting that there was no rational relationship be-
tween the promotion of family life and the denial to illegitimates of the
right to share in their fathers' estates because the denial of this right
would not influence the behavior of men and women. Moreover, the
Court concluded that penalizing children as a means of influencing the
behavior of their parents was inconsistent with the desire of the Illinois
legislature to improve the position of illegitimates under the intestacy
laws.' 9
This analysis appears inconsistent with the Court's prior decision in
Labine v. Vincent.20 In Labine the Court held that Louisiana's interest in
promoting legitimate family relationships justified exclusion of certain
classes of illegitimates from inheriting under the intestacy laws. The
court in Trimble attempted to explain this apparent inconsistency by dis-
tinguishing the two statutes involved. 2' Unlike the Illinois statute,
the Louisiana probate code differentiated between bastard children (un-
acknowledged illegitimates) who were given no inheritance rights, natural
children (acknowledged illegitimates) who were given limited inheritance
rights, and legitimate children who were given full inheritance rights.
The Court reasoned that these categories were consistent with a theory
of social reproach to illicit relationships and were an attempt by the
Louisiana legislature to deter such relationships. Also, the impact of the
discrimination in Labine was less severe because all illegitimate children
were entitled to some support from their fathers' estates. 22 However,
the Court recognized that the Illinois statute was examined more closely
17. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
18. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973). See also
Miller v. Laird, 349 F. Supp. 1034 (D.D.C. 1972).
19. 430 U.S. at 767-68. See* In re Estate of Karas, 61 Ill. 2d 40, 44-45, 329
N.E.2d 234, 236-37 (1975).
20. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
21. 430 U.S. at 768-69 n.13.
22. Id. at 776 n.17.
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than the Louisiana provision, and that to the extent the analysis differed,
Trimble would control. 23
The Court in Trimble reaffirmed the view, expressed in Labine, that
judicial deference to the state scheme of inheritance is appropriate when
the challenged intestacy provision involves the substantial state interest in
providing for stability of land titles by a quick and conclusive determina-
tion of the ownership of intestate property.2 4 However, while the
problems of proving paternity may compromise an orderly system of
inheritance, this concern cannot justify exclusion of all illegitimates.
There are certain classes of illegitimate children, e.g., those acknowl-
edged by their fathers, whose inheritance claims would not disrupt the
efficient disposition of intestate property.25 Therefore, the Illinois stat-
ute could not be justified on this basis.
An important factor in the Labine decision was that the challenged
statute did not present illegitimates with an insurmountable barrier to
inheritance. Under Louisiana law, 26 illegitimate children could be legiti-
mated by parents who later married, or by parents who could have mar-
ried at the time of conception and had no legitimate ascendants or de-
scendants. In addition, a formal acknowledgment of paternity by the
father entitited an illegitimate child to be a limited beneficiary under his
father's will, and alsd entitled him to claim monthly support from his
father's estate, even though he had no legal right to share equally in the
estate with any legitimate children. Because the father of the illegitimate
child in Labine had formally acknowledged paternity, the child was not
statutorily barred from sharing in her father's estate.27 Consequently, the
Court upheld the Louisiana statute.
The dissent in Labine attacked the majority's reasoning as implying
that any discrimination short of a total bar would be permissible.28 Such
an implication, the dissent argued, was inconsistent with the Court's
prior holding in Levy v. Louisiana.29 The majority in Labine had distin-
guished Levy as involving an insurmountable barrier to inheritance by
illegitimates. However, as the dissent pointed out, under the reasoning
of the majority, the challenged statute in Levy did not constitute a com-
plete bar because the illegitimate children would have recovered for the
wrongful death of their mother if she had formally acknowledged them.
The Court in Trimble weakened Labine by rejecting the argument
that statutory discrimination against illegitimates is permissible if there is
23. Id.
24. Id. at 767-68 n.12.
25. Id. at 772.
26. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 198, 200 (1952).
27. 401 U.S. at 533, 539.
28. 401 U.S. at 550-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
[Vol. 43120
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no insurmountable barrier to inheritance.30 Such an analysis, the Court
stated, is merely a hypothetical reshuffling of the facts to avoid the es-
sential question of the constitutionality of discrimination against illegiti-
mates in an intestate succession law. If the discrimination cannot with-
stand equal protection analysis, then it cannot be saved by the absence of
an insurmountable barrier.3 1
Mathews v. Lucas 32 was cited by the Court in Trimble as an indication
of the extent to which state legislatures can discriminate against illegiti-
mate children and still remain within constitutional boundaries. In Lucas
the Court upheld a statutory provision which conditioned entitlement to
Social Security disability benefits for certain illegitimate children on
proof of dependency at the time of the wage earner's death. 33 The
purpose of the provision was to replace support actually lost to the child
and not merely to provide support based on a legal obligation to sup-
port. The statute also provided that certain classes of illegitimates would
be presumed dependent and would automatically qualify for statutory
benefits. 34 However, all legitimate children were presumed dependent.
This distinction, the Court reasoned, was not between legitimate and il-
legitimate children, but between children who were most likely to be de-
pendent and those who were not.3 5 The Court concluded that the dis-
tinction was justified because it avoided the administrative burden of
case-by-case determinations of dependency.
The Court in Lucas recognized that the statutory classifications were
over-inclusive because some children would be presumed dependent
who were not. Nevertheless, the Court found the classifications permissi-
ble because they were reasonably related to the likelihood of depen-
dency.3 6 However, this conclusion is of questionable validity because the
percentage of illegitimate children who do not receive support from ab-
sent fathers is not significantly greater than that of similarly situated
30. 430 U.S- at 773-74.
31. Id.
32. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
33. See also Perry v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1971); Norton
v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Norton v.
Matthews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976); Watts v. Veneman, 334 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C.
1971), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 476 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ingalls Ship-
building Corp. v. Neuman, 322 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Miss. 1970).
34. An illegitimate child was presumed dependent if: (1) he would be enti-
tled to inherit from the insured parent under state law; (2) if the decedent had
gone through a marriage ceremony with the other parent which would have
been valid but for a nonobvious defect; (3) if the insured parent acknowledged
in writing that the child was his; (4) if the. insured parent had been decreed by a
court to be the child's father; or (5) if the insured parent had been ordered by a
court to support the child because the child was his. 427 U.S. at 498-99.
35. But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
36. 427 U.S. at 509.
1978]
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legitimate children. 37  Therefore, it can be argued that such statutory
presumptions impermissibly discriminate against illegitimate children.
Legitimate children who are similarly situated do not have the burden of
proving dependency, while illegitimate children do. For many illegiti-
mates this is a difficult, if not impossible, burden to carry.
A saving feature of the statutory scheme in Lucas was a provision
allowing benefits to all illegitimate children who could prove actual de-
pendency. The Court in Trimble indicated that the Illinois probate provi-
sion may have been upheld if it had allowed all illegitimate children who
could prove paternity to inherit from their fathers as well as their
mothers.38  However, the Court did not go so far as to say that the
Constitution requires that state intestacy laws provide all illegitimates the
opportunity to prove paternity. The Court indicated that certain classes
of illegitimate children could permissibly be denied the opportunity of
proving paternity, but failed to draw any clear lines as to which classes
could be so denied. Trimble suggests the possibility of a middle ground
between the extremes of a case-by-case determination of paternity and
the complete exclusion of illegitimates.3 9 The Court noted that evidence
of paternity can take a variety of forms, and that states are free to fash-
ion their own requirements of proof tailored to meet the problems of
inaccuracy and inefficiency.40 This freedom is limited, however, to the
extent that a state cannot refuse to recognize forms of proof that do not
compromise important state interests. Such formal proof might include
adjudication or formal acknowledgment of paternity. 41
In 1971, the Supreme Court dismissed appeals from two Minnesota
Supreme Court rulings that upheld a statute which prohibited an il-
legitimate child from inheriting intestate property from his father, unless
he could produce an attested, written declaration of paternity. 42 The
language in Trimble suggests that similar statutes will be upheld in the
37. Eighty-two percent of legitimate children do not receive support from
absent fathers compared with ninety percent of illegitimate children. See Beaty v.
Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300, 306 n.9 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974).
38. 430 U.S. at 772 n.14.
39. "For at least some significant categories of illegitimate children of intes-
tate men, inheritance rights can be recognized.... [B]ecause it excludes those
categories of illegitimate children unnecessarily, § 12 is constitutionally flawed."
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 771 (1977).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 772 n.14.
42. In re Estate of Breole, 287 Minn. 556, 178 N.W. 896 (1970), appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Kastano v. Northern City Nat'l Bank, 402 U.S. 902 (1971); In re
Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Hietala v. Heir of Pakarinen, 402 U.S. 903 (1971). See also Easley v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Mich. App. 451, 245 N.W.2d 785 (1976); In re
Johnsons Estate, 560 P.2d 962 (Okla. 1977). See generally Tenopir v. Boles Estate,
342 So. 2d 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
[Vol. 43
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future, 43 even though such provisions form an impenetrable barrier for
many illegitimates because inheritance rights are dependent solely upon
a formal act of the deceased father.4 4
There is little case law in Missouri concerning the right of illegiti-
mate children to inherit from their fathers. The leading case is R. v.
R. , 4 decided by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1968. On the basis of
Levy v. Louisiana, the court summarily held that the state could not pre-
clude illegitimate children from securing paternal support.46  Because
Levy involved the right of an illegitimate child to inherit from the estate
of his mother, the Missouri decision to extend the principle to the right
of paternal support may suggest a willingness on the part of the Mis-
souri Supreme Court to invalidate legislation which discriminates against
illegitimates.
47
In the wake of R. v. R. and Trimble, two Missouri inheritance sta-
tutes are vulnerable to constitutional attack. Section 474.060, RSMo
1969,48 like the challenged intestacy provision in Trimble, allows illegiti-
mate children to inherit only from their mothers, and, by negative impli-
cation, not from their fathers. This provision is clearly unconstitutional.
The Missouri pretermitted heir statute, section 474.240, RSMo
1969, 4 9 also is subject to challenge on equal protection grounds to the
43. 430 U.S. at 772 n.14.
44. The strongest justification for discriminating against illegitimates is the
difficulty of proving paternity and the related danger of spurious claims. The
Court conceded that the serious problems of proving paternity might justify "a
more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers'
estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their
mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally." Id. at 770.
45. 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
46. Id. See also In re L-, 499 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. En Banc 1973); S-v. W-,
514 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); State v. Tschirner, 504 S.W.2d 302(Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973); State v. Summers, 489 S.W.2d (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1972).
47. For the standard of proof of paternity in Missouri, see generally T.A.L.S.
v. R.D.B., 539 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); Corzine v. Stoff, 505
S.W.2d 162 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1973); S-J-B- v. S-F-S-, 504 S.W. 2d
233 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973); L-D- v. J-D-, 48f S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1972).
48. Section 474.060, RSMo 1969 provides: "Illegitimate children are capable
of inheriting and transmitting inheritance on the part of their mother, and a
mother may inherit from her illegitimate children, in like manner as if they had
been lawfully begotten of her."
49. Section 474.240, RSMo 1969 provides:
1. When a testator fails in his will to mention or provide for any of
his children born or adopted after the making of his last will, such
child, whether born before or after the testator's death, shall receive
a share in the estate of the testator equal in value to that which he
would have received if the testator had died intestate, unless it ap-
pears from the will that such omission was intentional, or unless
when the will was executed the testator had one or more children
1978]
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extent that illegitimate children are excluded from sharing property
under their fathers' wills. The Missouri Supreme Court decided the issue
of the applicability of the pretermitted heir statute to illegitimates in
Martin v. Claxton,5" which involved the omission of an illegitimate child
from his mother's will. The court held that the statute allowing an il-
legitimate child to inherit the intestate property of his mother conferred
all rights of inheritance from the mother. Therefore, an illegitimate
child could not be excluded under the pretermitted heir statute and
could inherit an intestate share of his mother's property when not men-
tioned in her will. In view of R. v. R. and Trimble, it is not unlikely that
the reasoning in Martin will be extended to the illegitimate child's in-
heritance rights in his father's estate.5'
In the past nine years, the United States Supreme Court slowly has
eliminated certain types of discrimination against illegitimate children.
However, none of the cases can be interpreted as holding that state
legislatures cannot treat illegitimate children differently than legitimate
children. Instead, the Court has provided legislatures with guidelines of
how to accomplish indirectly that which they are forbidden to do di-
rectly. The states cannot arbitrarily prohibit all illegitimate children from
inheriting their fathers' intestate property, but they are free to devise
requirements of proof of paternity so strict that the net result would be
the same as almost complete exclusion. The administrative convenience
of the state may be served by avoiding case-by-case determinations of
paternity, but the concepts of fairness and justice should not be rele-
gated to a lower priority merely to serve administrative convenience.
CAROL A. SCHWAB
known to him to be living and devised substantially all his estate to
his surviving spouse.
2. If, at the time of the making of his will, the testator believes that
any of his children are dead, and fails to provide for such child in
his will, the child shall receive a share in the estate of the testator
equal in value to that which he would have received if the testator
had died intestate, unless it appears from the will or from other
evidence that the testator would not have devised anything to such
child had he known that the child was alive.
50. 308 Mo. 314, 274 S.W. 77 (1925).
51. It should be noted that different issues are raised in the case of a will
than in the case of intestate succession. Because a will is a written expression of
the testators intent, excluded illegitimates are not as justified in complaining as
when the state bars inheritance under intestate succession laws. These differences
were recognized by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Hanson v. Markam, 356
N.E.2d-702 (Mass. 1976).
[Vol. 43
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